PIRATES

Richard P. Connolly

July 1995

     This article describes the operation of pirates, terrorists, smugglers, and other organizations around the world. The focus is to examine an aspect of life at sea that does significantly affect the lives of many people. These effects include influence on maritime trade, economic policies, and military operations. There are many diplomatic, social, and political consequences to these activities.

      Piracy crosses many international borders where the legal jurisdiction of the affected country may be nullified. This happens for a variety of reasons. Legal, political, and diplomatic boundaries and treaties may preclude the prosecution of individuals and organizations engaged in piracy.                                            

The Portuguese liner, SS Santa Maria was hijacked on January 21, 1961. The Santa Maria was the flagship of the Companhia Colonial de Navegacao or CCN. The liner displaced 21,750 tons and was 610 feet long. At the time of the hijacking, there were 600 passengers and 365 crewmembers aboard.                          

     The liner was taken over by Henrique Galvao, the leader of a Portuguese terrorist group called DRIL, the Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation. DRIL was a revolutionary organization engaged in an ineffectual uprising against the governments of Portugal and Spain. Galvao and 24 members of his organization captured the ship. The third officer was murdered and two crewmen wounded during the takeover¹.                                                                  

     During a twelve-day ordeal, the Santa Maria disappeared several times and was presumed lost. News of the hijacking was received from the island of Saint Lucia. The US Navy and the Royal Navy conducted a massive search for the hijacked vessel.

     The ship was located and shadowed by US Navy aircraft and destroyers.  At the end of ten days, the Santa Maria put into Recife, Brazil after negotiating with the Brazilian government and Rear Admiral Allen Smith, USN.                                                              

     Under threat of mutiny by the crew and a riot by the passengers, Galvao came to terms with the Brazilian and American governments. He surrendered the ship on February 3, 1961. He was granted political asylum and was not charged by the Brazilian government with the hijacking of the Santa Maria or the murder of third officer Nascimento Costa. Galvao and his men were granted political asylum by the Brazilian government.                                                                  

Henrigue Galvao had intended to sail the Santa Maria to Ghana on the west coast of Africa. His motive was to hold the ship and crew hostage until a political ransom could be extorted from the Portuguese government of President Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Galvao's intention was to start a revolt in the Portuguese colony of Angola. The ship did not sail to Ghana. A radio operator did not send a request to the Ghanaian government  from the Santa Maria for entry into Ghanaian waters. The operator performed a sleight of hand under the nose of Galvao and his guards in the radio room. The message was never sent.                      

     The hijacking of the Santa Maria is similar to the takeover of the Italian liner Achille Lauro in October 1985. 

     In October 1985 four Palestinian terrorists hijacked the 23,629-ton Achille Lauro four hours after departing Alexandria, Egypt. Among the 123 passengers and 315 crewmembers held hostage was Leon Klinghoffer of Manhattan. Klinghoffer was

murdered after entry of the ship into the Syrian port of Tartus was denied. The Achille Lauro proceeded to Port Said where the terrorists surrendered to Egyptian authorities. Thirty hours after the ship surrendered, the four terrorists and two PLO representatives, including Abul Abbas, the leader of the terrorist group PLF, the Palestine Liberation Front, departed for PLO headquarters in Tunis.

        Four US Navy F-14 fighters launched from the USS Saratoga intercepted the Egypt Air 737 south of Crete. Permission to land at Tunis and then Athens had previously been denied to the Egyptian jet.  The 737 was diverted to the Sigonella Naval Air Base in Sicily.

       At Sigonella heavily armed Italian Carabinieri and a detachment of SEAL Team 6², the US Navy�s elite anti-terrorist unit, met the plane. The terrorists were taken into custody by the Carabinieri after a dispute with the SEAL�s over the disposition of the prisoners.                             

      The Italians released Abul Abbas. Five terrorists were tried and convicted. They received sentences ranging from four to nine years. The hijacking of the Achille Lauro " ... was in fact a bungled terrorist attempt to launch an attack on the Israeli harbor of Ashod, using the cruise liner merely as transport³." The PLF terrorists were forced to take over the Achille Lauro, "after a waiter spotted them cleaning their guns.⁴".                                               

    In both cases, the hijackers primary objective was not reached. Both groups of were forced to improvise their plans. DRIL improvised from the planning stages to the end of the seizure of the Santa Maria. This included canceling the passage of two terrorists and some weapons due to a lack of funds. Galvao intended to recruit passengers into his organization during the take over. Six passengers did signup with DRIL. The Brazilian government granted them political asylum.

   Ship hijacking is a complicated and expensive operation for a terrorist group. The goal of this type of takeover is to generate as much publicity as possible. A military objective is secondary. The means of achieving publicity can be very violent.

 On April 7, 1961, the British passenger liner Dara was rocked by a bomb off the coast of Dubai. A fire started and 238 people were killed before the ship sank. Responsibility for the bombing has never been proven. Omani rebels were thought to have been involved⁵.

      Cruise liner security is now an important part of the industry. The Achille Lauro affair provided the impetus for the introduction of incredibly tight security measures on passenger liners. Security measures include the use of airport style metal detectors, X-ray machines to view carry-on luggage, and strict identification procedures for passengers and crew. When the ship is tendering, x-ray machines are now set up at the gangway for returning passengers. This measure is used to detect weapons being brought aboard. Cruise lines now maintain on board security staffs for the protection of the ships. The cruise lines cooperate with law enforcement officials of various governments to counter the threats of piracy, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking at sea. 

     Many governments maintain anti-terrorist groups that are trained in the recapture of hijacked cruise liners. Among them are SEAL Team 6, the FBI Hostage Rescue Team, the Delta Force, and Germany's GSG-9. The Special Air Service and the Special Boat Service is trained to recapture cruise liners. The Royal Marines maintain Commochio Group. This group is specifically trained to recapture oilrigs and cruise liners in the event of a terrorist takeover. There are many oilrigs in the North Sea that would provide a large target for a takeover.  

      The French government has at hand Groupe d'intervention de la Grendarmerie National (GIGN). This is the French anti-terrorist unit. The French intelligence service, the DGSE, sank the Green Peace ship, the Rainbow Warrior at Auckland, New Zealand. The agents were caught and convicted by the New Zealand government. This may be defined as state sponsored terrorism or national security. This definition depends upon the goals of the organization or government involved at the time.   

     These issues are complex. They have ranged from gun running into Ireland by the IRA or Russian mini-subs sailing in Swedish territorial waters to the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors in support of the Contras. Many aspects of international law are involved to determine the legality of such actions. The lines dividing piracy, terrorism, and state-sponsored terrorism may be delineated by the motives of the individuals or groups involved.    

     Pirates and terrorists are treated as criminals under most legal codes. They are not looked upon as being political prisoners or prisoners of war. They do not have a government charter to rob and plunder at sea. State sponsored terrorism is a dubious exception. A privateer is a privately owned ship authorized by a government to attack and capture enemy vessels during wartime.     

      A pirate is defined as, " One who robs at sea or plunders the land from the sea without commission from a sovereign nation⁶. ".  Piracy is an act committed by private citizens for profit, usually monetary. Pirates do not seem to be guided by any legal, moral, or nationalist sentiment or cause.                                                                                                                                    

     Thai and Vietnamese pirates operating in the South China Sea have been known to attack small ships and boats carrying immigrants and refugees from Southeast Asia to other countries such as the United States and Canada. These boat people come from China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. The pirates have boarded vessels and killed all aboard. The immigrants are first robbed and then, at times, attacked with machetes. Many victims are thrown overboard to drown.          

      Pirates have raped many women. One consequence of these rapes is the spread of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, to the victim or to the pirate. There have been no surveys to assess the spread of HIV in this manner.                                       

     Large Asian criminal enterprises engage in piracy as a part of doing business. These syndicates engage in prostitution, narcotics trafficking, slavery, gunrunning, and other activities. Selling stolen cargoes is one aspect of the business.                                                            

     Much of doing business involves the theft of cargoes in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The cargoes include coffee, electronics, and cement. Other profitable cargoes are steel, women's apparel, children's toys and petroleum products.                                     The stolen goods are then laundered through various enterprises. The cargoes eventually become legitimate, at least on paper, and are sold for a profit.                            

     There are approximately 120 ship hijackings per year. Most happen near Singapore and in the South China Sea. Other areas hit by pirates include Lagos and Port Harcourt in Nigeria, Monrovia, Liberia, and Freetown, Sierra Leonne⁷. Ships are robbed in the Mediterranean, off Brazil, and the Caribbean. There is no shortage of slow, heavily laden targets for pirates to rob.

     Much of the piracy in the Caribbean is related to the narcotics trade with the United States. Many small boats are pressed into service by drug smugglers. The boats are hijacked and the crews disappear.  The smugglers use them for drug transportation. After delivery of the narcotics, the boats disappear. The owners or passengers are reported as missing.   

     This type of piracy will continue until the demand for illicit narcotics is significantly reduced in the United States. The theft of small pleasure boats for the drug trade is merely an expedient means of transport used by smugglers. Russia is currently experiencing a great flow of narcotics in and a great flow of weapons, art, technology, minerals, and almost anything sellable, out. This is the type of environment that fosters piracy. The central government is seen as ineffectual and non-productive. The situation is creating opportunities for promising illegal enterprises in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and in the Sea of Japan.  

     These enterprises include the shipping of drugs into Japan. The illegal importation of weapons will accompany Japan's growing drug problem. This will result in an increase of piracy in northern Asia.

      Most areas of the world are relatively safe from pirate attacks. Most cargo ships are robbed at night. The crew is usually sleeping, with only a few members on watch. The ship is low in the water and proceeding at slow speed. The pirates approach in speedboats and climb aboard using grappling hooks and slings. They usually rob the captain's safe, the crew's belongings, and cargo. They may steal personal items such as radios, clothing, electronics, and jewelry. They usually do not engage in murder.

      However, in 1989, the captain of the Pacific International Lines Hai Hui disappeared from the bridge of his ship. Tsui Hungting, 55, "...is believed to have struggled." with one or more of a dozen attackers. He was the only member of the crew involved in the robbery⁸.

      Ship's captains have been advised to post more lookouts when sailing at night. Pirates have been repelled while trying to board ships by crewmembers using fire hoses.

      A number of companies do not report hijackings at sea. The companies fear that their insurance rates will rise if they report attacks on their vessels. This is rarely true. Shipmasters are embarrassed to report attacks due to laziness in basic security measures. There is also much paperwork involved in reporting attacks on shipping.  

     Oil tankers are a favorite of pirates due to their slow speed and low freeboard. They are easier to climb aboard than container ships that are higher in the water and faster. Increased patrolling by local police and naval forces has periodically reduced the number of attacks, but not eliminated them. The pirates return when the frequency of patrols diminishes.  This seems to by true in whatever area of the world that pirates operate. The only really effective counter-measure is a disciplined and alert crew willing to safeguard their vessel from attack.

          Piracy has been around for 1500 years. It is not going to disappear. Piracy is an alluring and profitable business. It has diversified into terrorism, petty theft, grand larceny, organized crime and narcotics trafficking. The Jolly Roger is gone, but piracy is basically the same. As long as there are ships and boats sailing the seas, there will be people robbing and attacking them.

NOTES

1.   Gault, Owen. Part Two: Conclusion. "Spotlight on Terror: The Seizure of the Santa  

Maria". Sea Classics. ed. Schnepf, Edwin A. (North Hollywood, CA. July, 1995) P. 52- 58.

 2.   Griswold, Terry, and D.M. Giangreco Delta: America�s Elite Counter terrorist Force.    

      (Osceola, WI. 1992) P.71. 

3.   Russel, George. "The U.S. Sends A Message". Time. ed. Cave, Ray. (New York,

      October 21, 1985) P. 24.   

4.   Smith, William E. "The Voyage of the Achille Lauro". Time. ed. Cave, Ray. (New York,

      October 21, 1985) P. 30

5.   Shaw, James L. "When Terrorists Struck the Motor ship Dara". Sea Classics. (North

      Hollywood, CA. May 1983) P.18-24.

6.   Morris, William. ed. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.

      (Boston, 1973) P.998.

 7.   Shaw, Susan. "Asia�s Modern Pirates". World Press. ed. Jackson, R. Edward. (New 

      York, April, 1991)

 8.   Shaw, P.41

SOURCES CONSULTED

1.   Block, Eugene. "The Bizarre Pirates of the Bear". Sea Classics. Vol.15, no.1. January  

      1982. pp 66-72. 

2.   Cary, Peter and Bruce B. Auster. "What�s Wrong With the Navy"? US News & World

      Report. July 13, 1992. pp 22-29.

3.   Dane, Abe. "Americas Secret Commandos". Popular Mechanics. September 1992. pp 

      25-33. 

4.   Day, Beth. Passage Perilous. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1962. 

5.   Gibbs, Nancy R. "Dire Straits". Time. August 29, 1994. pp 28-32. 

6.   Kidron, Michael and Ronald Segal. The State of the World   

     Atlas. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981. 

7.   Schneider, Samuel A. Jr. "Mayday! Mayday!" , New York: Donald F. Fine, Inc. 1990. 

8.   Shaw, James L. "When Terrorists Struck the Motorship Dara� Sea Classics.  Vol.16,

      No.3. May, 1983. pp 18-22. 

9.   Shaw, Susan. "Asia�s Modern Pirates". World Press Review. April 1991. p 41. 

10.  Tech Update. "Sleuthing ROV's Solve Crime". Popular Mechanics. September 1991. 

       p 18.

11.  "The Verdict was Guilty". Macleans. December 2, 1985. p 44.                                                          

12.  Woodward, Bob. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA. 1981-1987. New York: Simon &  

       Schuster, 1987.

Pirates was originally submitted to the US Naval Institutes International Navies Essay Contest in 1995.

 For more information about piracy, please see the the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre